Gilles Deleuze From A to Zwith Claire Parnet · 1988–1989

J as in Joy

Letter J of Gilles Deleuze’s L’Abécédaire (From A to Z), an interview with Claire Parnet directed by Pierre-André Boutang (1988–1989). Length: 20 min. Video with French, English and Spanish subtitles and the full transcript.

Transcript

Claire ParnetSo, "J" is "Joy," this is a concept to which you are particularly attached since it's a Spinozist concept, and Spinoza turned joy into a concept of resistance and life: let us avoid sad passions, let us live with joy in order to be at the maximum of our power of action; therefore, we must flee from resignation, bad faith, guilt, all sad affects that priests, judges, and psychoanalysts exploit. So we can see entirely why you would be pleased by all that. So first, I would like you to distinguish what the difference is between joy and sadness, both for Spinoza and for you, of course? First, is Spinoza's distinction entirely yours? Did you find something there on the day you read that?

Ah yes, since these texts are the most extraordinarily charged with affect, in Spinoza. That comes down to saying- to simplify greatly- it comes down to saying that joy is everything that consists in fulfilling a power of action. . . You experience joy when you fulfill it, when you realize one of your powers of action. So, what is that? Let's return to some earlier examples: I conquer, however little this might be, a small piece of color, I enter a little further into color. I think that is what joy might be. That's what fulfilling a power of action is, realizing a power of action, causing a power of action to be fulfilled. But it's the word puissance that is ambiguous. What about the opposite, what is sadness? It occurs when one is separated from a power of action of which I believed myself, rightly or wrongly, to be capable: I could have done that, but circumstances didn't allow it, or it was forbidden, or etc. That's what sadness is, and one must say that all sadness is the effect of a power over me.

Claire ParnetNo, but it's Gilles' turn to speak, he was talking about the. . . well, the opposition joy/sadness.

So I was saying that realizing the power of action of something is always good, that's what Spinoza said. Obviously, all this poses problems, more details are needed because there are no bad potentials; what is bad, is the lowest degree of the power of action, and its lowest degree is power. I mean, what is wickedness? It's preventing someone from doing that of which he/she is capable, wickedness is preventing one from realizing one's power of action. Such that there is no bad power of action, only wicked powers... Maybe all power is wicked by its very nature, but perhaps not necessarily, maybe it's too easy to say that. But, the confusion between powers of action and powers is quite costly because power always separates people who are subjected to it from what they are capable of doing. Spinoza started from this point, and you were saying that sadness is linked to priests, to tyrants. . .

Claire ParnetTo judges. . .

. . . to judges, and these are perpetually the people, right? who separate their subjects from what they are capable of doing, who forbid them from realizing powers of action. You alluded earlier, it was very curious, you alluded to the reputation of Nietzsche's anti-Semitism. There, we see quite well, because it's a very important question. . . There are texts of Nietzsche that are, in fact, quite disturbing, or that one might consider quite disturbing if they are read, in fact, in the manner mentioned earlier about reading philosophers, that is, if one reads them a bit too quickly. What strikes me as curious is that in all the texts in which [Nietzsche] lashes out against the Jewish people, what does he reproach them for? And what made people then say, "Oh, he's anti-Semitic," etc.? What Nietzsche reproaches the Jewish people for is very interesting. Nietzsche reproaches them in quite specific conditions for having invented a character that had never existed before the Jewish people, the character of the priest. To my knowledge, never in any text by Nietzsche concerning Jews is there a general attack mode, but always an attack against the Jewish people-inventors of the priest. Although, according to him, in other social formations, there can be sorcerers, scribes, these are not at all the same as the priest. They made this astonishing invention, and Nietzsche, since he has great philosophical strength, Nietzsche never ceases to admire that which he detests. . . He says, it's simply an incredible invention, to have invented the priest, it's something quite astounding. And this results in an immediate connection occurring between the Jews and Christians, but simply not the same type of priest. So the Christians will conceive of another type of priest and will continue in the same path, with the character of the priesthood. This shows the extent to which philosophy is concrete. I mean that, I would say that Nietzsche is, to my knowledge, the first philosopher to have invented, created, the concept of the priest, and from that point, to have posed a fundamental problem: what does sacerdotal power consist of? What is the difference between sacerdotal power and royal power? This is a question that remains entirely actual. For example, shortly before his death, Foucault had fully discovered, and through his own means-and here, we could start all over from the beginning about what it means to continue, to extend philosophy, what does it mean to do philosophy? -Here, it's with Foucault proposing pastoral power, a new concept that is not the same as Nietzsche's, but that engages directly with Nietzsche, and in this way, one develops a history of thought. So, what is this power of the priest, and how is it linked to sadness? According to Nietzsche, in any case, this priest is defined as such: he invents the idea that men exist in a state of infinite debt, that they have infinite debt. Before, there were certainly stories about debt, it's well known, but Nietzsche preceded ethnologists, and they would do well to read some Nietzsche. When the ethnologists discovered, well after Nietzsche, that in so-called primitive societies, there were exchanges of debt, and perpetually it did not rely on barter as much as had been believed, things functioned through pieces of debt- a tribe that has a debt vis-à-vis another tribe, etc. Yes, but these were blocks of finite debt, they received and then gave them back. The difference with barter is that there was time, the reality of time. . . It's differed return. This is immense since it suggests that debt was primary in relation to exchange. These are all properly philosophical problems-exchange, debt, debt that is primary in relation to exchange, it's an enormous philosophical concept. I say "philosophical" because Nietzsche was talking about this well before the ethnologists. In so far as debt exists in a finite regime, man can free himself from it. When the Jewish priest invokes the idea by virtue of an alliance of infinite debt between the Jewish people and their God, when the Christians adopt this in another form, the idea of infinite debt linked to original sin, this reveals the very curious character of the priest about which it is philosophy's responsibility to create the concept. I am not claiming that philosophy is necessarily atheist. But in the case of an author like Spinoza who had already outlined an analysis of the priest, of the Jewish priest, in the Theologico-Political Treatise. . . It happens that philosophical concepts are veritable characters, and that's what makes philosophy so concrete. Creating the concept of the priest is like another kind of artist would create a painting of the priest, the portrait of the priest. So, the concept of the priest pursued by Spinoza, and then by Nietzsche, and finally by Foucault forms an exciting lineage. I would like, for example, to link myself with this as well, to reflect a bit on this pastoral power, that some people say no longer functions. But, one would have to see how it has been taken up again, for example, psychoanalysis as the new avatar of pastoral power. And how do we define it? Priests are not the same thing as tyrants, one mustn't mix everything up. . . but they at least have in common that they derive their power from the sad passions that they inspire in men, of the sort: "Repent in the name of infinite debt, you are the objects of infinite debt," etc. It's through this that they have power. It's in that sense that power is always an obstacle blocking the realization of powers of action, whereas. . . I would say that all power is sad, even if those who have it seem to revel in having it, but it is still a sad joy. There are sad joys, and this is a sad joy. On the other hand, joy is the realization of a power of action. I know of no powers of action that would be wicked. The typhoon is a power of action, it must delight in its soul, but. . . but it's not in destroying houses that it delights, it's in its being. . . Taking delight is always delighting in being what one is, that is, in having reached where one is. Joy is not self-satisfaction, being pleased with oneself, not at all, not the pleasure of being happy with oneself. Rather, it's the pleasure in conquest, as Nietzsche said, but the conquest does not consist of enslaving people, conquest is, for example, for a painter to conquer color, yes, that's what a conquest is. That's what joy is, even if it goes badly because. . . in these stories of power of action, when one conquers a power of action, when one conquers something in a power of action, it happens that it is too strong for one's own self, so he will crack up, Van Gogh.

Claire ParnetSo, a little subsidiary question. You, who have been fortunate to escape from infinite debt, how is it that you complain from morning to night, and that you are the great advocate of the complaint and the elegy?

This is a personal question. First, the elegy is one of the two sources of poetry, It's one of the principal sources of poetry, it's the great complaint. So, there is quite a bit. . . there is an entire history of the elegy to be done. . . I don't know if it already has been done but it's very interesting because there is the complaint of the prophet -prophetism, the prophet is the one who complains, is the one who says, "Oh why did God choose me? What did I do to be chosen by God?" In a sense, it's the opposite of the priest. So he complains and complains about what occurs to him. It means: it overwhelms me, that's what the complaint is: what's happening to me overwhelms me. If one accepts that this is what the complaint is. . . It's not something we always see. It's not "ow ow ow, I'm in pain," although it could also be that, but the person complaining doesn't always know what he/she means. The elderly lady who complains about her rheumatism, she means, in fact, what power of action is taking hold of my leg that is too great for me to stand it? It overwhelms me. If we look at history, it's very interesting. The elegy, first, is a source of poetry, it's the only Latin poetry, the great Latin poets. . . I used to know them, I used to read them quite a bit, like Catullus, Tiberius, they are astounding poets. And what is the elegy? I think that it's the expression of he/she who, temporarily or not, no longer has any social status. That's why it's interesting. . . A little old man complaining, sure ok. . . some guy in prison complains -it's not sadness at all, but something quite different, it's making a demand, there is something astonishing in the complaint, there is an adoration in the complaint. . . The complaint is like a prayer. So, popular complaints. . . One has to include everything in this: the complaint of the prophet, or something you know well since you've worked on it so much- the complaint of hypochondriacs. The hypochondriac is someone who complains, and the intensity of the complaints are beautiful. Why do I have a liver? Why do I have a spleen? It's not even how much it's hurting me, it's why do I have it? why do I have organs? why am I . . . So, the complaint is sublime. And the popular complaint. . . The complaint of the assassin, the complaint that is sung by the people. It's the socially excluded who are in a situation of complaint. There is a Chinese specialist. . . He's not Chinese, but Hungarian, I think, called [Ferenc] Tökei, who prepared a study of the Chinese elegy, and he showed, as I recall it, that the Chinese elegy is enlivened above all by the person who no longer possesses a social status, i.e. the freed slave. A slave, however unfortunate he or she might be, still has a social status. He might be very unfortunate, might be beaten, whatever you like, but he still has a social status. When he is freed, there were periods when there was no social status for the freed slave. He is outside everything. The liberation of American blacks must have been something like that, with the abolition of slavery . . . or in Russia, when no statute had been foreseen. So they find themselves excluded, which has been interpreted stupidly as, "You see? they come back to their position as slaves!" But they have no status and so are excluded from any community. Then the great complaint is born, Aye aye aye aye aye. . . However, it does not express the pain they have, but is a kind of song. That's why the complaint is a great poetic source. If I hadn't been a philosopher and if I had been a woman, I would have wanted to be a wailer. . . The wailer is marvelous because the complaint rises and it's an art. And that also has this rather perfidious side as well, as if to say: don't take on my complaint, don't touch me. It's kind of like people who are too polite. . . These too polite people. . . I would like to be more and more polite, it's: "don't touch me," so it's a kind of. . .. And the complaint is the same thing: "don't feel sorry for me, I'm taking care of it." And in taking care of it for oneself, the complaint is transformed. Once again, it's: 'what is happening to me overwhelms me." That's what the complaint is. Now, I would like to say every morning, "what's happening to me overwhelms me," because this is joy. In some ways, this is joy in a pure state, but we are careful to hide it because there are people who aren'tvery pleased with someone being joyous, so you have to hide it in a kind of complaint. But this complaint is not only joy, it's also an incredible anxiety, in fact. . . realizing a power of action, perhaps, but at what price? Am I going to lose my life for this? As soon as one realizes a power of action. . . I am speaking about things as simple as a painter taking on color, might he not be risking his life? Literally, after all, I don't think it really is some literary invention to say that the way Van Gogh went toward color is more connected to his madness than all these psychoanalytical stories. For a relation to color intervenes here in any case. Something risks getting broken, it overwhelms me, and that's what the complaint is, something overwhelms me, in misfortune or in happiness, but usually misfortune, but well, that's just a detail.

Claire ParnetGreat answer.